

National Défense Defence nationale

ASSISTANT DEPUTY MINISTER (SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY) / LE SOUS-MINISTRE ADJOINT (SCIENCE ET TECHNOLOGIE)

Director General Air Force and Navy (DGSTAN) / Le directeur général de la Force aérienne et la Marine (DGSTAM)



"In Silico"

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Dale F. Reding

Director General - S&T Air Force and Navy (DGSTAN) / Le directeur général de la Force aérienne et la Marine (DGSTAM)

Defence Research and Development Canada / Recherche et développement pour la défense Canada October 16 2018 DEFENSE INTOINNES INTOINE OFFICES DEFENSE ACCOUNTS CONTINUES INTO A CONTENT OF THE SAME DEFENSE INTO A CONTENT OF THE SAME CONTENTS INTO A CONTENT OF THE SAME OFFICE OF THE SAME INTO A CONTENT OF THE SAME OFFICE OF THE SAME INTO A CONTENT OF THE SAME OFFICE OF THE SAME INTO A CONTENT OF THE SAME OFFICE OF THE SAME INTO A CONTENT OF THE SAME OFFICE OF THE SAME INTO A CONTENT OF THE SAME OFFICE OFFI



DRDC | RDDC

SECURITY TECHNOLOGY SCIENCE TECHNOLOGIE SÉCURITÉ

0.1 OUTLINE



Why M&S is important?

Modelling and Simulation as a "*cognitive crutch*" Limitations

How we use M&S?

Canadian M&S Examples

What are the future challenges?

Emerging Technologies

1.1 Homo Sapien Technologicus

Stories, Games & Tools







We are challenged to understanding <u>complex</u> and <u>complicated</u> (human-information-physical) systems

 Employ reductive and narrative tools; simplified models/games; explore options and act accordingly

Decision processes

"The slowness of our thinking and the small amount of information that we can process at any one time, our tendency to protect our sense of competence, the limited inflow capacity of our memory, and our tendency to focus only on immediately pressing problems – these are the simple causes of the mistakes we make in dealing with complex systems."

Dietrich Dörner, The Logic of Failure (1989)



- Decision Making
 - {reduce costs, optimize, control, improve, manage risks}
 - Explainability
- Expandability
- Increased complexity
- Fidelity
- Reality of LVC
 - Omission; Negative Transfer; Negative Learning
 - Not as good as real?
 - Cost versus complexity
 - LVC balance
- Reuse / KM
- Ways and mean
 - As a service / In the cloud
 - Networked
 - Interoperability
- "Care and feeding"
- CFD and FEA
 - e.g. advanced manufacturing & design
- New Technologies



2.1 STRONG. SECURE. ENGAGED.



Simulation and modelling will be instrumental in achieving these goals!

STRONG AT HOME

- Enhanced air and maritime surveillance and control, including Arctic
- Concurrent response to multiple domestic emergencies
- Support to counter-terrorism
- · Search and rescue support
- · Looking after our people

SECURE IN NORTH AMERICA

- Modernize NORAD
- Expanded aerospace and maritime domain awareness and control
- · Cutting edge defence innovation

ENGAGED IN THE WORLD

CAF prepared to concurrently deploy:

- 2 major sustained deployments
- 1 major time-limited deployment (6-9 months)
- 2 minor sustained & 2 minor time-limited deployments
- 1 Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) mission
- 1 Non-combatant Evacuation Operation

Increase of Increase of 1,500 New Total Increase of Reinvented Integrate GBA+ 3,500 Tax relief **Reserve Force** – Taking care **Putting our** Health and 1,150 civilians transition of ill and meet Regular for deployed full-time of Families Wellness to support and injured to gender & **People First** Force for operations capability, part-Strategy operations service/civilian life diversity targets key priorities time force **Investing in** Capability enhancements, Rebuild core capabilities: 88 fighter Increase emerging capabilities in Invest additional \$62B for including intelligence, satellite aircraft, 15 surface combatants, 2 cyber, space, and remotely piloted the Future capital expenses to \$104B communications. surveillance joint support ships, 6 Arctic offshore vehicles to maintain effectiveness Force and logistics vehicles and interoperability with allies patrol ships A transformative More accountable. **Reduced carbon footprint** Modernized infrastructure Modernizing innovation agenda with through green infrastructure management through transparent, and the Business defence research clusters streamlined defence expanded partnership with and focus on energy of Defence the private sector linked to procurement procurement process efficiency



NEW INITIATIVES

Fleet Options

Objective:

To provide evidence and insight into CSC fleet size and how it affects the operational output of the fleet and the ability to meet expected demand



Supply over Demand

		Months at High Readiness / OPCYCLE														E
		12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26
Number of Ships in Fleet	20	68.8%	72.2%	75.7%	79.1%	82.2%	85.3%	88.4%	90.2%	92.0%	93.8%	94.6%	95.5%	96.3%	96.8%	97.4%
	19	66.5%	70.0%	73.2%	76.5%	79.7%	82.7%	85.6%	88.5%	90.2%	91.9%	93.6%	94.5%	95.3%	96.1%	96.7%
	18	64.2%	67.6%	70.8%	73.9%	77.0%	80.0%	82.8%	85.6%	88.4%	90.0%	91.6%	93.2%	94.3%	95.1%	95.8%
	17	61.9%	65.1%	68.4%	71.3%	74.3%	77.2%	80.0%	82.7%	85.3%	87.9%	89.6%	91.2%	92.7%	94.0%	94.7%
	16	59.6%	62.6%	65.7%	68.8%	71.5%	74.3%	77.0%	79.7%	82.2%	84.7%	87.1%	89.1%	90.5%	92.0%	93.4%
	15	57.3%	60.2%	63.0%	65.9%	68.8%	71.3%	73.9%	76.5%	79.1%	81.4%	83.7%	86.1%	88.4%	89.7%	91.1%
	14	53.9%	57.7%	60.4%	63.0%	65.7%	68.4%	70.8%	73.2%	75.7%	78.1%	80.3%	82.5%	84.7%	86.8%	88.7%
	13	50.5%	54.2%	57.7%	60.2%	62.6%	65.1%	67.6%	70.0%	72.2%	74.5%	76.7%	78.9%	81.0%	83.0%	85.0%
	12	47.0%	50.5%	53.9%	57.3%	59.6%	61.9%	64.2%	66.5%	68.8%	70.8%	72.9%	75.0%	77.0%	79.1%	81.0%
	11	43.6%	46.8%	49.9%	53.0%	56.2%	58.6%	60.7%	62.8%	64.9%	67.0%	69.1%	71.0%	72.9%	74.8%	76.7%
	10	40.2%	43.1%	45.9%	48.8%	51.6%	54.5%	57.3%	59.2%	61.1%	63.0%	64.9%	66.8%	68.8%	70.5%	72.2%
	9	35.8%	39.1%	41.9%	44.5%	47.0%	49.6%	52.2%	54.7%	57.3%	59.0%	60.7%	62.5%	64.2%	65.9%	67.6%
	8	31.5%	34.4%	37.3%	40.2%	42.5%	44.8%	47.0%	49.3%	51.6%	53.9%	56.2%	58.1%	59.6%	61.1%	62.6%
	7	27.1%	29.6%	32.2%	34.7%	37.3%	39.8%	41.9%	43.9%	45.9%	47.9%	49.9%	51.9%	53.9%	55.9%	57.7%
	6	22.7%	24.9%	27.1%	29.3%	31.5%	33.6%	35.8%	38.0%	40.2%	41.9%	43.6%	45.3%	47.0%	48.8%	50.5%

2.3 Impact of the Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels

Objective:

To assess the effectiveness of an RCN Force Structure with and without the MCDVs and to quantify the gap and impact of losing the 12 MCDVs on operational output



Operational Demand Satisfied





2.4 Ship Design and Acquisition



- Arctic Patrol Vessel
 - Experiments and numerical simulations strongly influenced design, including utilization of active stabilizer fins



- MV Asterix
 - M&S applied to ensure safe integration into naval operations



Submarine Collision Modelling



Response to Hostile Threats



- Royal Canadian Navy & Air Force
 operate helicopters in Sea State 6
 - 4 to 6 m significant wave height
- Aerodynamic effects significantly contribute to the challenges
- Modelling and simulation is being used to support safe flying activities
 - Improve flight simulators for training and testing during shipboard operations
- Apply SHOLAS tools for helicopters to future UAS acquisitions and certification
- Allow ship design optimization through the use of virtual reality and flight simulation tools
 - e.g. Joint Support Ships



2.6 Naval Battle Management Lab





2.7 PARSim: Pilot Production Absorption Retention Simulation







A options test bed:

- Pilot training options
- Pilots transfers
- Platform replacement (Fighter)
- Platform introduction (Strat lift)
- Feeder fleet (Light Helo to Heavy Helo)
- Splitting fleet (Light Helo & Spec Ops)

2.8 RCAF Simulation Strategy



Vision

Training

By 2025, the RCAF will have a simulation focused training system, leveraging live, virtual, and constructive (LVC) domains within a networked common synthetic environment





Ways and Means

- Networked and Common Services
- Increased Interoperability and reduced support costs
- Operational community simulation centres and satellite training devices

2.9 EO/IR Virtual Proving Ground (VPG) "Integrated M&S"_____

 A system-of-systems based on high-fidelity simulations to optimize self-defence against EO/IR-guided threat systems to improve force protection and combat effectiveness in high threat environments.

PIRATES

Harfang

- The current technical challenges in EW are:
 - Threat diversity, complexity, variability & inconsistency
 - Off-the-shelf self-protection systems # off-the-self protection
 - Countermeasures are lagging behind the threats



- Based on M&S technology to capture knowledge into executable models
- Integrated answer at a level of language significant and useful to the CAF operators



3.1 Increasingly Complex Security Environment:

2013 - 2040





3.2 Emerging Technologies





Human – Information – Physical Domains

3.3 Emerging M&S Opportunities & Challenges



Hype Cycle for Emerging Technologies, 2018



gartner.com/SmarterWithGartner

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Gartner

Human augmentation Autonomy **Conversational AI Quantum Computing Deep Neural Networks Brain-Computer** Interfaces Smart Workspace **Digital Twin** Virtual Assistants **Mixed Reality Augmented Reality Neuromorphic** Hardware Advanced Manufacturing / 4D Printing **Predictive Analytics Virtual Reality** Advanced Materials

Cyber vulnerabilities

4.0 Summary



Common themes and challenges

- Changing strategic environment
- Translation of emerging technologies to effective M&S capabilities and modeling the impact of these technologies on concepts, doctrine and operations
- Explainable M&S
- Complex & complicated systems
- Ethical, legal and policy frameworks
- Emerging Technologies & Environments

Simulation & Modeling





Human – Information – Physical Domains

- Key S&T Areas
 - AI / Big Data
 - Quantum Computing
 - Algorithms
 - Autonomy
 - Human Systems
 - Cyber



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